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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the indirect drivers of value creation in private equity, through a study 
of corporate governance mechanisms employed by the major Norwegian PE actors in a 
population of Norwegian portfolio company investments. More specifically, it focuses on 
board representation by PE actors in the venture capital and buyout portfolio company 
investments. For this study, data pertaining to debt/equity, return on assets and portfolio 
company size has been collected for the current active population of portfolio company 
investments for the period (t-1) (one year before PE investment) as well as for (t+1) (one year 
after PE investment).  
The data on changes in debt/equity has shown that PE actors in buyouts generally increase 
leverage and/or restructure the capital structure of target investments. All PE actors are 
represented on the boards of their portfolio companies. The degree of board representation of 
these PE actors in their target company investments doesn’t show a clear trend over time, 
hence I have undertaken a qualitative analysis of six portfolio company cases to examine 
deviations in PE board representation from the main population. The results from these case 
studies indicate that PE actors are involved on a strategic, financial and operational level. The 
degree of PE board representation largely depends on factors such as the strategic positioning 
of these portfolio companies and industry conditions. In terms of the Norwegian population 
of active portfolio company investments, the findings indicate that the major PE actors focus 
on a range of investment segments, in addition to the oil sector. The investments are however, 
geographically regionally clustered. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Private equity, a well-known asset class in the US, has also become influential in Europe in 
recent years. According to Frontier Economics Private Equity Study (2013), PE can 
contribute to economic growth in Europe. Economy-wide productivity can be improved 
through attracting incremental investable funds, building more resilient companies and 
raising the operating profitability of portfolio companies (Frontier Economics Private Equity 
Study 2013) p 10.  
Private equity firms make investments in these portfolio companies through funds which 
mostly obtain capital from institutional investors. Their aim is to produce favourable returns 
for these investors, given a limited investment time horizon. PE directs its focus on small and 
medium sized unquoted companies which face problems in obtaining capital in the public 
market. The unique PE governance structure aims to align incentives of all parties, including 
investors and other members of society.  
1.2 Motivation 
Private equity is currently a hot topic in the Norwegian media. Carsten Bienz has been quoted  
mentioning the importance of the oil and gas sector in Norway to the contribution of the 
success of energy related PE funds (Schultz, Trumpy 2013). Bienz also mentioned that these 
funds have received high returns in Norway in recent years due to good economic conditions 
and ease of transaction making.  
Although the Norwegian private equity market is still young with respect to the US and 
Europe, there are interesting recent observative trends. According to Menon Economics 
(2010), PE portfolio companies generated value creation of 1,2 % of Norwegian BNP. 
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The Norwegian private equity market has received increased foreign attention in the last few 
years in terms of amount invested and fundraising, as shown by Argentum Markets. Having 
looked into literature on private equity in Norway, I realized that there is dearth of detailed 
studies on the impact of PE governance mechanisms on value creation. This makes it 
interesting to study private equity and its unique governance structure. 
1.3 Aims 
This thesis aims to identify the parameters that influence the representation of private 
equity companies on boards of their portfolio companies. 
My thesis aims to study corporate governance mechanisms in private equity. More 
specifically, I have studied active ownership through board representation by the major 
Norwegian PE actors in the Norwegian population of portfolio company investments. The 
thesis also looks into whether these actors make extensive use of debt in their investments in 
the part of private equity known as buyouts. Hopefully my thesis will provide some 
interesting observations on the indirect drivers of value creation, through a study of corporate 
governance mechanisms in the Norwegian population of portfolio company investments. 
1.4 The Scope of the Work 
The scope of the thesis is restricted to the Norwegian population of portfolio company 
investments of the major Norwegian PE actors. This is chosen as the focus due to time 
constraints and access to data sources. My focus is on whether the following variables have 
any association with the number of board members from the PE firm in the portfolio 
companies: 
1) Change in debt to equity 
2) Return on Assets 
3) Portfolio company size (as measured by number of employees) 
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1.5 Limitations 
The main limitation of my thesis is the small number of portfolio companies I employ. Due to 
time constraints, I choose to only focus my attention on the Norwegian portfolio of the four 
major Norwegian PE actors. My population is restricted given that all of these actors also 
choose to divert significant attention to foreign companies in their portfolios.  
My approach to analysis is through observing changes one year before PE investment versus 
one year after investment for the portfolio companies. For some of the latest investments, I 
was unable to acquire annual reports for the year after investment (t+1) from the 
Brønnøysund Register of Company Accounts. This was the case for investments made in 
2012 and after. In some cases, I could also not obtain annual reports for the year before 
investment (t-1) if the companies were newly established.  
The major PE actors didn’t have time to be interviewed, so this approach to analysis was not 
an option. Interviews would have also been time consuming and subject to bias.  
1.6 Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research subject. It describes 
in brief the backround of the research topic, motivation for research, aims, scope of study and 
the limitations. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to a literature survery on private equity, types of portfolio company 
investments that can be undertaken and governance mechanisms used in such investments. 
This section is concluded with empirical evidence from the venture capital and buyout 
sectors.  
Chapter 3 gives an overview of the Norwegian PE market, and Chapter 4 describes the 
research methodology used for studying the Norwegian PE market. 
Chapter 5 presents the results and a discussion of these in relation to relevant theory. 
Chapter 6 provides conclusions for the study of the population of Norwegian portfolio 
companies of the major PE actors in Norway. 
Chapter 7 makes suggestions for future studies. Relevant references are included at the end 
of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 Introduction 
This section presents literature on the private equity industry, the way it is organized and 
types of portfolio company investments that are made. This is then followed by a presentation 
of various corporate governance mechanisms that are employed in such portfolio company 
investments. The section is concluded with evidence from the venture capital and buyout 
sector. 
In Chapter 3, these theories will be discussed in the context of Norwegian portfolio company 
investments.  
2.2 What is Private Equity? 
There are two ways to raise equity; it can either be raised in the public or in the private 
market. Most businesses are not exchange listed and therefore unable to access capital 
through the public markets, hence they may turn to private equity to acquire capital. Private 
equity, in simple terms, is a medium or long-term equity investment that is not publicly 
traded on an exchange (Cendrowski and Wadecki 2012) p 4. Broadly, PE encompasses 
investments in all types of unquoted businesses, irrespective of their industry stage. PE is 
normally organized in the form of different funds with a limited time horizon, varying from 
about three to ten years. Such a time horizon allows these actors time to implement value 
creating changes. PE actors not only provide commited share capital, but also competence 
through active participation on the company boards and close contact with management as 
(Grunfeld and Jakobsen 2007) highlight. To achieve this active ownership, PE actors acquire 
large stakes in their companies. As active owners, PE funds function as middlemen for the 
fund investors and portfolio company management. 
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2.3 Organization of Private Equity 
Private equity investments can be achieved either through a fund, or through direct capital 
investment in portfolio companies. According to Metrick and Yasuda (2011), private equity 
funds exhibit the following characteristics: 
1. PE funds act as financial intermediaries which means that they invest capital from 
investors directly in portfolio companies 
2. PE funds only make investments in private companies. This means that such 
companies are unable to go public right after investment. 
3. PE funds aid their portfolio companies through active monitoring. Through the 
investment contracts they enter into, they can monitor management through board 
seats, as well as various types of rights entitled to them. 
4. The ultimate goal of the PE fund is to maximise its financial returns after exiting 
respective investments. Investments can be exited through a sale or IPO (initial public 
offering). 
The funds are generally organized as limited partnerships. The fund managers who manage 
capital investments on the behalf of their investors, are usually known as general partners. 
These general partners choose which companies to buy, how to manage such companies and 
when to sell them. The general partners (or GPs) earn fees annually as a percentage of the 
commited capital. They are also additionally entitled to a certain percentage of fund profit. 
This is known as carried interest.  Investors are denoted as limited partners. They don’t have 
a say in decision making but share in gains or losses from the investments. Examples of 
potential investors can include; pension funds, banks, insurance companies, foundations, etc. 
Fund lifetime usually spans from about 8-10 years. Figure 2.1 is a diagram showing typical 
stages PE funds go through over their time span, as illustrated by Cendrowski and Wadecki 
(2012) pg 7.  
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Cendrowski and Wadecki (2012) illustrate in detail the four stages: 
1. Organization/fundraising: This stage involves establishing the fund and the necessary 
capital from investors. The investment strategy is then set with regards to which sector to 
focus on and type/stage/geography of companies. Fundraising is challenging for these 
funds given strict regulation. Fundraising is usually achieved through word of mouth 
among limited partners.  
2. Investment: This stage involves finding and establishing deals before investing in 
portfolio companies. Here PE firms can also enlist the help of other funds for backing to 
give them a solid foundation for investing in the portfolio companies. 
3. Management of portfolios: After investing in the portfolio companies, the PE firm may 
choose to work with existing management or replace them with their own members. 
General partners can hedge portfolio risk by forming relationships with their counterparts. 
These investments are formally known as syndicated investments. This additionally 
allows a general partner to sell his share of investment if he wishes to exit.  
4. Harvest / Disinvestment: The PE firm needs to establish here which investments are 
worthy of pursuing further and which need to be exited. The general partners want to 
realize returns on their fund assets. Not all portfolio company investments will prove 
successful. In other words, the poor investments need to be filtered from the good ones. 
Harvesting is a way for the funds to realize their returns for investors while additionally 
allowing managers to sell shares they hold. Portfolio company harvesting can be done in 
several ways; through a sale, IPO (initial public offering) or a merger, for example. In an 
exit/harvest, a portion of the shares of the portfolio company are sold either to the public 
or to corporate buyers.  
2.4 Types of Portfolio Company Investments 
When investing in portfolio companies, PE funds are usually backed by large lenders, 
investment banks or hedge funds. PE funds take up short-term loans which are packaged into 
commercial mortgage-backed securities and also resold. There is a difference between loans 
for home owners and PE funds. According to Appelbaum and Batt (2012) p 14 A critical 
difference is that home owners pay their own mortgages whereas private equity funds require 
portfolio firms to take out these loans-thus making them, not the private equity investors, 
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responsible for the loans. Earnings from the invested portfolio companies are used to service 
debt in the deals. 
Investments in portfolio companies are characterized by the age of these companies and 
where they are in terms of their life cycle. The following types of portfolio company 
investments can be made as suggested by Cendrowski and Wadecki (2012) and illustrated in 
Figure 2.2. 
• Angel investments 
• Early stage & Later Stage Venture Capital investments 
• Buyouts 
Angel investments can be made in early start-up companies with potential. Such investments 
can prove risky, which is why investors require large equity stakes or investment in debt 
securities. Seed investments are also investments in immature companies, but they are a little 
more mature than angel investments.  
Early stage venture capital companies often require investments to realize their business plans 
and establish facilities to deliver a product to the end user. The later stage venture capital 
companies on the other hand, may just require a small amount of capital to further stimulate 
returns. Later stage investments could be less risky than early stage ones given that such 
companies may already have their products and technology sorted. Staged capital investments 
are a way to mitigate risk by investing gradually as the company shows results.  
Portfolio companies in the buyout sector are either mature private or public companies. 
Potential buyout company targets normally possess strong cash flows, leadership and low 
debt/equity ratio. In leverage buyouts (LBOs), cash is used to service debt used for the deal. 
This is a primary reason why strong cash flows are considered important. MBOs or 
management buyouts are characterized by the firm management acquiring a large stake in the 
business. An IBO or institutional buyout occurs when a financial institution takes a 
controlling stake in a company but without any involvement from management. The 
institution can establish their own management if deemed necessary after the buyout. Related 
investments, called distressed investments, are a specialized section of buyouts. Such target 
portfolio company investments are in their mature stages as well as being under distress.  
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In addition to the aforementioned stages, Grunfeld and Jacobsen (2007) additionally mention 
an expansion stage. This stage is often associated with internationalization. PE actors can aid 
management in portfolio companies in the internationalization process decision making, 
through strategic and operational advice before entering new markets. Portfolio companies 
can also receive funding from PE actors, helping their internationalization efforts. 
NVCA Activity Report (2012) shows that in terms of amount invested in the Norwegian PE 
market, the buyout sector has received the most attention compared to venture capital and 
seed investments. Seed investments received the least attention. “Investments within the seed 
segment amounted to only NOK 3 mill in H1 2012.”1 
2.5 Motives for PE Investment in Portfolio Companies 
PE actors attempt to alleviate agency costs between limited partners and portfolio company 
management through board representation in portfolio companies. Transaction cost theory 
discusses the use of boards as one of many governance mechanisms that PE actors employ in 
portfolio company investments. The agency and transaction cost theories are two motives for 
PE investment in portfolio companies. 
2.5.a Agency Theory 
Some of the most well-known theoretical contributions on agency theory are by Michael 
Jensen and William Meckling. In this theory, the agent conducts a duty on behalf of the 
principal as defined in a contract. A postcontractual issue arises as the principal is unable to 
perfectly monitor the activities of the agent. This is a result of asymmetric information, where 
one party (the agent) has more information than the other party (the principal). The danger 
associated with the agent pursuing his/her own interests after the contract is signed, is 
referred to as moral hazard. A way to mitigate or avoid the principal-agent problem is 
through the enforcement of complete contracts. But as Williamson (1984) illustrates, in 
practice this is not possible since one can not predict all contingencies, such contracts are too 
complex, and they are very difficult to monitor. Agency theory also assumes a seperation 
between ownership and control. In the positive stream of agency theory, the managers act as 
                                               
1
 NVCA Activity Report 2012 
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agents on behalf of the owners or shareholders of the firm. The normative stream, also called 
common agency theory, considers all principal-agent relationships (Huse 2007) p 45.  
Agency costs consist of monitoring/intervention costs for the principal, bonding costs for the 
agent to signal credibility to the principal and residual loss. Residual loss is the loss resulting 
from the agent not making value maximising decisions for the principal. Agency costs can 
arise between the general partners and limited partners, but also between the limited partners 
and the management of the target company. The general partners monitor their respective 
target companies on behalf of the limited partners. The alleviation of agency costs are one 
motive for PE firms to invest in their portfolio companies. Jensen and Meckling acknowledge 
that serious agency costs exist as a result of free cash flows in the case of public companies. 
Agency costs also persist in the context of buyouts in the research of Opler and Titman 
(1993). (Jensen 1989) acknowledges that value can be generated in buyouts through 
alleviation of such agency costs. “PE practices enable the capture of value destroyed by 
agency problems” Baldi (2013) p 36. Garg (2013) suggests that venture companies do not 
have such extreme agency costs when compared to public firms. He argues that there are not 
so many opportunities for managers to misuse company resources, given that venture 
capitalists often have small cash flows and limited resources. Additionally, the separation 
between ownership and control is smaller as venture CEOs often own acquire a large 
ownership stake. 
One way agency costs can be reduced is through the participation of many parties in PE 
contracts and transactions. Other examples of ways in which these agency costs can be 
reduced are through provision of adequate incentives aligning shareholders and managers, 
monitoring and active strategy designs.  
Examples of agency problems include perquisites and empire building. Perks are on-the-job 
consumption by managers. Empire building is related to managers pursuing growth instead of 
positive NPV projects to maximise shareholder value. Managers can forego value creating 
projects, in an attempt to pursue their own interests. 
2.5.b Transaction Cost Theory versus Agency Theory 
Transaction cost theory is thus a theory of governance mechanism, while agency theory is a 
theory about incentives (Huse, 2007) p 51. Boards and contractual agreements are examples 
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of two such governance mechanisms used by PE actors. Such actors are always, and not 
discontinuously involved in governance as Baldi (2013) explains. Both agency and 
transaction cost theory assume that individuals are boundadly rational, but transaction cost 
theory focuses on analysis from the perspective of transactions. Bounded rationality implies 
that individuals are neither hyperrational nor are they totally irrational. Bounded rational 
agents can attempt to mitigate conflicts arising from transactions through cost-effective 
contracts honoring the parties involved.  
2.6 Identifying Private Equity Targets 
Before selecting suitable portfolio companies for investment, PE actors engage in pre-
screening activities. This is done to evaluate whether the companies have potential to grow 
and become profitable. The portfolio company selection process can prove challenging for 
the PE actors given the asymmetric information problem that exists between these actors and 
the entrepreneurs in the companies. These entrepreneurs are better informed about the state of 
the portfolio companies and could mislead PE actors by not informing them about all 
contingencies. Asymmetric information can result in PE actors not selecting the optimal 
projects. Given that the asymmetric information problem exists, it becomes important for PE 
actors to possess selection competance. PE funds need to analyse companies and company 
specific conditions, in addition to possessing strategic and financial knowledge. PE funds 
tend to have selection criterias which help then narrow the process of finding investments. 
Such criterias allow PE funds to acquire competence for certain regions, company types, 
company sizes and investment phases. They can build a resource base suited for the specific 
challenges facing companies matching their selection criteria. Their resource base can direct 
capital to the most innovative companies, or perhaps also pool resources for companies with 
similar capital needs. It is important to not narrow selection criteria too much in small 
markets, as these could complicate the selection process. Grunfeld and Jakobsen (2007) 
mention that Norwegian PE actors should internationalize to a larger extent, when selecting 
investments. Gompers and and Lerner (1999) show that venture fund companies target 
sectors with high uncertainty, information asymmetries, high share of immaterial resources 
and immature markets. This is where such funds feel they have the best selection gain. The 
focus on this thesis will be on the employment of corporate governance mechanisms by the 
PE actors after they have made portfolio company investments.  
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2.7 Value of Internal Control in PE Firms and Their Portfolio 
Companies 
To define internal control, we can use the framework established by Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Internal control is an 
ongoing process affecting the employees in the organization and provides a sense of 
assurance regarding the fulfillment of organizational objectives. Internal control mechanisms 
vary depending on organizational characteristics. Figure 2.3 is a graphic representation of the 
COSO model and its elements. 
Internal control can be viewed both from the PE fund level and also from the portfolio 
company level. Having solid internal control routines effectivise operations and improve 
reporting according to the set standards and ensure compliance. 
In terms of the PE fund level, internal control can improve resource allocation and utilization 
in operations. It can ensure consistency and reliability in reporting according to set reporting 
standards. It can contribute to compliance with respect to industry norms/standards. In terms 
of reporting, it is important to have internal control routines so that investors and managers 
can value fund and portfolio company performance accurately. Reporting and performance 
standards can become standardized across industries, making it easier in the hiring process. 
Such control mechanisms can increase investment from investors with fraud prevention 
measures being implemented. Control can thus alleviate risk. 
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FIGURE 2.3 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
model and its elements. 
Source: COSO-Internal Control, Integrated framwork 
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To achieve the reporting, operational and compliance goals in PE funds or portfolio 
companies, the following COSO control components could be considered, as mentioned by 
Cendrowski and Wadecki (2012) p 193: 
• Control Enviroment: The environment in the organization should be aware of the 
importance of change. There should be a strong leadership presence and board of 
director presence. 
• Risk assessment: Internal and external risks/threats should be identified. 
• Control activities: These activities can either prevent the occurance of unforeseen 
events or properly alert the organization when something that has occured requires 
attention. 
• Information and communication: This component ensures that the message of change 
is communicated to all relevant parties, such as portfolio companies. Information 
exchange channels need to be in place internally as well as externally.  
• Monitoring: This can assess the performance and operations to observe where change 
needs to be implemented. 
PE funds often evaluate internal control in portfolio companies based on objectives and 
control components, before making an acquisition. PE firms evaluate internal control in 
portfolio companies based on operational value, reliability of financial statements and 
compliance to laws and regulations. Such internal evaluations aid PE firms when trying to 
access value and transparency in target company(s). Internal control evaluations in target 
companies can contribute to postive internal rates of return for the PE firms. 
2.8 Active Ownership 
Investors in portfolio companies take an active ownership role through the commitment of 
long-term capital. They provide not only financial competance, but also assistance on an 
operational level (Keasey et. al 2005). Given their leadership competence during the holding 
period, they can make active changes to management and alleviate potential agency conflicts 
through the employment of various corporate governance mechanisms. 
 Chapter 2 Literature Survey 
 
17 
 
2.9 Corporate Governance in Private Equity Sponsored 
Companies versus Public Companies 
Cashin et al. (2009) consider five fundamental differences between private equity sponsored 
companies and public companies in terms of management and governance structures. 
1. Private equity companies, have owner overseers whereas public companies have 
independent outsiders. 
2. Private equity sponsored companies have longer time horizons than public companies. 
This time horizon is typically between five to seven years. 
3. There is a tendency for boards of private equity sponsored firms to have more 
financial expertise and deeper industry knowledge. Board meetings are issue oriented, 
not show-and-tell. (Cashin et al., 2009) p 161.  
4. Boards of private equity sponsored firms can direct their focus to the most vital issues 
of business. Boards of public firms can be influenced by managerial power if the 
manager has power in the board of director selection process. Public company boards 
may prioritize monitoring top management, instead of focusing on performance. 
Public company boards may also not face significant consequences for loss or 
destruction of shareholder value. 
5. Leverage is often imposed in PE sponsored companies if there are low interest rates to 
capitalize on and favourable debt covenants.  
In terms of advantages, Cashin et al. (2009) highlight that private equity sponsored 
companies have a competitive advantage over public companies in that they do not have to 
make their strategies or operations publically available. In this way, they do not disclose too 
much of value to their nearest competitors. Public companies on the other hand, are required 
to publish accounting and financial information that could potentially be sensitive. There is 
risk in terms of money invested for board members of private equity sponsored companies. 
This higher risk and stake gives these board members an incentive to generate wealth. Public 
companies can be more short-term focused whereas private equity sponsored companies are 
not bogged down by short-term thinking and can correct mistakes as they appear. 
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2.10 Private Equity Governance Mechanisms 
Goergen (2012) p 84 defines corporate governance mechanisms as those arrangements that 
mitigate conflicts of interests that corporations may face. Such conflicts of interests can arise 
between managers and providers of finance, shareholders and stakeholders and types of 
shareholders (such as large vs. minority shareholders).   
2.10.a Strategic Plans 
Private Equity firms are active investors in their portfolio companies and have unique 
governance mechanisms in place to carry out this active ownership. Corporate governance 
has to do with responding and acting to change. Such change should be embraced firstly by 
management before it can be implemented by the other layers of the organization. Private 
equity firms aid their respective companies with devision and execution of strategic plans. 
This can even be done before the formalization of deals, through the analysis of financial 
figures, like cash position. Performance issues in portfolio companies are brought to the 
surface through reporting requirements and controls set by the investing private equity firms. 
Reporting transparency is important for the investment company as it is used for evaluating 
performance, and is a governance mechanism.  
2.10.b Role of Boards 
Private equity actors actively establish themselves on boards of their investing companies. 
The board advises and rewards managers, who are in charge of the daily operations of the 
company, to maximise shareholder wealth. The board’s roles can be divided into a service 
and control role. The service role has to do with the enhancement of reputation, establishment 
of contacts with external environment and counseling of executives. Control role involves 
looking at whether the CEO is performing in the best interests of the owners and evaluating 
company performance. How well a board conducts its service and control role is contingent 
on ownership concentration and company size. If a small number of owners own the majority 
of stock, this is an argument for the active involvement of these owners on the board. The 
board’s control role can become more important with increasing firm size and complexity. 
The need to enhance firm legitimacy also increases.  
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Garg (2013) argues that in the case of venture capitalists, the provision of resources can 
substitute the board monitoring role. The provision of high-quality resources can limit the 
need for extensive monitoring, as he discusses. 
2.10.c Structure of Boards 
PE actors establish themselves on boards of their respective portfolio companies. Such 
independent board of directors can ensure that the ‘owners’ interests are protected. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) acknowledge that board independence and knowledge are the main 
requirements of the board members. The general partners of the PE firm are totally 
independent of the management in the portfolio company. These general partners can choose 
to either work with existing management, but may not hesitate to replace them if they prove 
themselves incompetant. The CEO tends to be the only internal member of the portfolio 
company present on the board. Internal and external board members are described by Keasey 
et. al (2005). They divide outside directors into the following two categories: 
- Affiliated outsiders: These are individuals with some form of affiliation to the 
company, either through past relations or top management positions. 
- Non-affiliated outsiders: These are individuals with no relation to the firm except for 
potential stock ownership  
Having PE directors on the board can be important for discussing strategic matters relating to 
the company. Such directors can monitor management, provide council and a valuable 
external network.  Having these directors on the board can aid in the restructuring process of 
the respective portfolio companies. Cornelli and Karakas (2008) find in their study that most 
PE funds prefer to use their own employees/partners as opposed to outsiders. The total 
number of PE board members in a portfolio company can depend on the complexity of the 
investment transaction.  
2.10.d Boards and Performance 
Boards have an indirect effect on company performance. Such company performance can be 
measured by accounting measures such as return on assets and return on equity. The agency 
theorists differ from the legalists in that they focus on market-based measures of financial 
performance as opposed to accounting-based measures.  
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Pearce and Zahra (1989) indicate that having a reasonable number of external board members 
has a more positive effect on financial performance than having fewer numbers. Tetlock 
(1983) mentions how board monitoring can improve performance through creating 
accountability. Garg (2013) highlights a problem he refers to as the “principal problem” in 
venture capital firms. Board monitoring can prevent incentivized directors from pursuing 
harmful firm interests. For instance, highly aligned VC directors can undermine the focal 
firm’s interests in order to protect their portfolio-level interests (Garg 2013) p 103. It can be 
hard to monitor activities undermining focal firm interests if these VC directors have power. 
Garg (2013) however, highlights that too much board monitoring can negatively impact upon 
performance by inhbiting innovation. He finds a curvilinear relationship between venture 
boards and performance. Grunfeld and Jakobsen (2007) mention that boards in PE focus on 
goal formulation, strategic choices, demands for returns and incentivizing top management. 
Such measures are said to improve portfolio company effectiveness and growth. Through 
tight bonds with management in portfolio companies, PE boards can transfer their 
competence. This can improve the strategic position of the company either in its local market 
or in the pursuit of new international markets. The improvement of strategic position can be 
an indirect driver of potential future performance.  
2.10.e PE Deals 
Another mechanism to address agency costs and the misalignment of interests between 
managers and shareholders is through deals PE actors implement. Managers at portfolio 
companies are incentivised through large equity stakes in such deals, which drive them to 
create value in the companies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) highlight that shareholder 
incentives to overcome the free-rider problem and engage in active monitoring increases with 
equity share. Good value ensures a good exit after the investment period retires. Incentivised 
managers can make cash available by closing unprofitable segments of the business. As they 
are incentivised through large equity stakes, these managers don’t need that extensive 
monitoring from the PE company. After adjusting for management selecting an attractive 
deal, evidence suggests that the size of management’s equity stake remains an important 
influence on performance (Wright, Gilligan et al. 2009) p 7. The PE managers may however, 
intervene under times of financial distress. Public companies also receive incentives, these 
are in the form of stock options. By their nature, stock options may be exercised at any point 
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after their grant date before expiry; in contrast, the equity stakes granted to managers of PE 
firms can be liquidated only after the company has a successful exit event or after the shares 
vest (Cendrowski and Wadecki 2012) p 172. The equity stakes PE firms offer tend to be 
larger than those offered in public companies. The stake can depend on the size of the deal 
and whether or not the PE firms want to attract the best talent.  
2.10.f Dividends 
Dividends can be used as an internal governance mechanism to incentivise managers to 
generate cash flows. Dividend payout can provide a signal that the portfolio company wishes 
to pursue shareholder value maximisation. Through dividend payout, the free cash flow 
available in the firm is reduced and hence also the agency costs. Dividend payout can also 
reduce the disiplinary work of the board of directors to some extent. Paying out dividends can 
however subject the company to scrutiny by the press if they have to regularily seek new 
financing.  
In the case of the PE industry, actors often use debt with subinvestment grades to pay 
dividends mainly to their sponsors. These dividend payouts are referred to as “dividend 
recapitalisations”. PE actors have been able to fund these dividend payouts as a result of 
strong credit markets yielding lower borrowing costs for debt. Such payouts can be carried 
out to make money from existing portfolio company investments, if IPOs or trade sales prove 
tough. “Dividend recapitalisations” have been controversial in the past where buyout groups 
have been accused of loading portfolio companies with debt to pay themselves big profits.2 
There is a concern that if PE actors take out cash from their companies to pay such dividends, 
that their incentive for supporting these companies in future efforts could be lessened. 
2.10.g Time Horizon of PE Fund 
A governance mechanism to ensure that optimal shareholder value is achieved is through the 
limited time horizon of the PE fond. This can provide incentives for managers to create value, 
as do the large equity stakes provided to them. Managers have a short time horizon to follow 
and implement plans before the PE firm exits the deal after some years. During the time 
                                               
2
 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fe4847a4-c924-11e2-bb56-00144feab7de.html#axzz2k3idGif3 
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horizon of investment, compensation structures can also be altered.  It is important for the PE 
funds to get consistent high returns in the top quartiles. If the funds do not perform 
consistently well, it can impact upon receipt of future funding, increasing debt interest rates 
or even lead to bankrupcy of the PE firm.  
2.10.h Debt 
Historically, it is known that PE firms leverage their portfolio companies. They use portfolio 
company free cash flows to convert debt to equity in their investment period. In a study 
conducted by Achleitner, Betzer and Gider (2010), the PE targets in their sample are found to 
have stable earnings and low distress costs. This is used as an argument to increase debt 
financing, and the authors argue that this is a mechanism to reduce agency costs. The general 
and limited partners of the funds are largely shielded from the debt effects of distress in 
portfolio companies as Appelbaum and Batt (2012) discuss. It is only the equity that they 
invest in portfolio companies that is at risk. Debt has the advantage that it has to be serviced 
periodically, which can reduce empire building or managers seeking private benefits at the 
expense of the company. Debt also has the advantage of tax deductibility of interest 
payments. Tax shields from debt can increase company value. Achleitner, Betzer et al. (2013) 
find support for the tax benefit of leverage as well as for the bonding advantage of leverage. 
This bonding advantage of leverage implies that PE investors prefer investing in companies 
with low leverage (and potential for more leverage) and high free cash flows.  
The negative aspect of debt however, is the increasing risk of bankrupcy, in terms of higher 
direct & indirect costs of default. The effects of bankrupcy can be devastational for the 
operating portfolio companies, even though not felt so greatly by the PE firm. Engel, Braun et 
al. (2012) argue a linear positive relationship between leverage and equity returns. They 
observe that at low leverage levels, the positive effects of debt outweigh the risks associated 
with default. 
2.10.i Experience 
According to Wright, Gilligan et al. (2009) experience is an important mechanism for 
improving portfolio company performance in deals. The authors argue that more experienced 
PE firms tend to build better businesses. PE firms are believed to have selection competence 
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allowing them to build a resource based targeted for specific regions, industries, sectors, 
company phases and company sizes. This resource base can for example direct resources to 
the most innovative and promising companies, which may not have access to capital from the 
banking sector. The managers in PE firms often have relevant branch experience or 
management consulting backrounds. Hitec Vision is an example of a PE firm with branch 
focus. PE actors can further gain knowledge and sector experience through acquiring 
knowledge from growing business environments. Kehoe and Heel (2005) discover that 
differences in PE actor performance arise from their ability to impact the competitive natures 
of their portfolio companies. Differences in experience between actors also arise from their 
varying abilities to exercise active ownership through the strategic, financial and operational 
competence they provide in company boards.  
Corporate governance mechanisms, like the aforementioned ones, are implemented for both 
the PE firm and in the investing portfolio company at all layers. This is to insure high returns 
for the investors of the fund (limited partners) and value for the portfolio company before the 
deal is exited. The PE firms themselves are aware that the free cash flows of their portfolio 
companies only can go to the limited partners and not to funding of other firms. In other 
words, incentives are in place for both the PE firms and for the portfolio companies. The type 
of governance measures that are implemented depend on what aspects of performance need 
improvement in the portfolio companies. Such performance aspects could for example vary 
from growth to efficiency. The type of PE firm, amount of leverage and managerial stakes 
put in place, are contingent on each individual company case. The corporate governance 
mechanisms also vary depending on location. For example, the continental European market 
is different with respect to the Anglo-Saxon.  
Public company PE firms are on the rise and differ in corporate governance mechanisms 
compared to the usual PE firms. The reporting and regulatory standards will be different for 
such public company PE firms. 
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2.11 Evidence from Venture Capital and Buyout Sector 
2.11.a Evidence from Venture Capital 
Puri and Zarutskie (2010) find evidence that Venture Capital (VC)-backed firms grow faster, 
are younger and larger compared to firms that do not have VC backing. According to (Inderst 
and Mueller 2009), the success of venture capital business model depends on the market. 
Newly emerging markets are found to have the the best potential for venture capital 
investment, in terms of growth for portfolio companies and returns for the investing actors.  
Evidence is found suggesting venture firms employ corporate governance mechanisms, 
which were highlighted in the above section. Gompers (1995) finds that firms with high 
levels of agency costs receive more frequent monitoring. Botazzi et. al (2008) discover that 
experienced venture capitalists provide hands-on interaction and interaction with their 
portfolio companies. Baker and Gompers (2003) find more independent boards as a result of 
venture backing. The board representations of venture capital actors can increase if the 
portfolio companies and the venture capital companies are distant from eachother as Lerner 
(1995) finds. Cornelli et at. al (2010) also document active board roles in their East European 
data sample. In terms of incentives, Inderst et. al (2007) find that entrepreneurs in the 
companies can have the incentive to outperform their industry peers.  Such incentives can be 
created by the staged funding and capital rationing that venture capitalists provide, making 
entrepreneurs motived to work for results.  
2.11.b Evidence from Buyout Sector 
Valkama et al. (2013) find that deal characteristics, funding, macroeconomic and industry 
factors affect portfolio company level returns in the buyout sector. Industry and GDP growth 
positively impact upon portfolio company level returns. In the literature, leverage is thought 
to increase firm-level holding period returns due to an increased pressure to service debt. In 
terms of leverage, the authors find that this doesn’t create value in buyouts. Leverage seems 
to just inflate returns for equity in successful buyouts. They also distinguish between buyouts 
and buy-ins. MBIs or management buy-ins are leveraged buyouts using private equity 
investors operating by themselves, or with a new/partially new management team. MBOs or 
management buy-outs are led by the management of the target company receiving private 
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equity backing. The authors discover that buy-outs outperform buy-ins. This could be a result 
of MBOs having inside information and an informational advantage over outside 
management teams in MBIs.   
Guo et al. (2011) found high financial returns for buyout transactions between the years 1990 
and 2006. The tax benefit of leverage was one factor contributing to these returns. 
Cotter and Peck (2001) fouind that long-term debt was used in buyouts along with active 
monitoring of the portfolio companies. Baker and Wruck (1989) acknowledged that the 
disciplinary function of debt and managerial ownership were important in their sample, but 
that also incentive compensation plans as well as relationships between the PE sponsors, 
managers, and board of directors were equally important for performance. Acharya et al. 
(2009) find that boards in buyout-backed companies are active in terms of strategy 
development and operations. In non-buyout companies however, the board role is more 
concerned with matters pertaining to supervision and monitoring. Cornelli and Karakas 
(2008) find the following board changes as a result of public to private transactions: 
- Significant reduction in board size 
- Outside directors being replaced by members of the PE firm 
- Higher presence of PE members in the board in cases where more time and effort is 
required 
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CHAPTER 3 
NORWEGIAN PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 presented general principles that govern private equity. This chapter presents an 
overview of the Norwegian PE market. The information gained from these two chapters shall 
be used to develop the research methodology in Chapter 4 and critically discuss the 
observations in Chapter 5. 
3.2 Norwegian Venture Capital Association (NVCA) 
Norwegian Venture Capital Association (NVCA) is the interest organization for those 
involved in the Norwegian private equity industry. This association aims to provide an 
understanding of the industry to promote future growth and development. It also strives to 
build networks between private equity companies in Norway and abroad, and to establish 
effective collaboration with communities which need the industry’s expertise.3 It has 90 
members of which 37 are primary and 53 are associated. The majority of the primary 
members invest in the oil and energy sector. A Norwegian private equity company as defined 
by NVCA, is a company with its headquarters in Norway.   
3.3 Major Norwegian Actors 
Herkules Capital was established in 2003 and is leading Norwegian Private Equity firm with 
a total capital base of NOK 12.25 billion. 4 It has its headquarters in Norway and focuses on 
portfolio companies in the Small/Mid-Cap buyout sector primarily in Nordic countries. Each 
of its three funds has a capital base ranging from 2-6 billion NOK.  
 
                                               
3
 http://nvca.no 
4
 www.argentum.no 
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HitecVision is another well established actor in the Norwegian buyout market, with 
headquarters in Stavanger, Norway. They specialize primarily in oil and gas in Europe and 
North America. Their total capital base is of USD 1.2 billion.  
Energy Ventures were established in 2002 and are a venture capital firm headquartered in 
Stavanger, Norway. Like Hitecvision, they have an international presence with offices in 
Houston and Aberdeen. Energy Ventures direct their focus on energy. 
Reiten & Co Capital Partners, a buyout firm established in 1992, have a generalist industry 
focus. They have since their establishment, developed into one of the leading Nordic private 
equity firms. They are headquartered in Norway. 
3.4 PE Investments 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the number of investments conducted in the Norwegian private equity 
market from 2008-2013, for venture capital and buyout sectors. From 2011-2012, the buyout 
sector had generally a stable level of investments. The number of buyout investments 
declined however, from 2012 Q4 to a virtually non-existant level in 2013 Q1. For venture 
capital on the other hand in 2013 Q1, number of investments trebled to seven compared to 
2012 Q4. The graph additionally illustrates that the number of investments by venture capital 
have generally been higher than those made in the buyout sector in the period 2008-2013. 
This could be because Norway has a well developed capital market for venture capital. 
3.5 Amount Invested in Norwegian PE Market 
In terms of the amount invested in the Norwegian private equity market, there has been more 
attention given to the buyout sector as opposed to the venture sector in the period 2008-2013 
(Figure 3.2). Although the amount invested in 2013 Q1 declined from the 2012 Q4 level, 
there was still a strong interest in the market from international private equity funds. 
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Non-Norwegian private equity funds accounted for as much as 97 percent of the total amount 
invested in Norwegian companies in the first quarter.5  In 2012, there was also strong interest 
by Non-Norwegian funds in the Norwegian market. Overall in 2012, Non-Norwegian funds 
accounted for 64 percent of the total amount invested by private equity funds in Norway.2  
Figure 3.2 shows the amount invested in Norwegian Private Equity from 2008-2013. 
It will be interesting to see whether this increased interest in the Norwegian market will be 
sustained in the future. It will also be interesting to see whether the fundraising levels for 
buyouts will increase in the future. Norwegian funds raised about half of the total amount in 
the Nordic market in 2012. Figure 3.3 illustrates fundraising activity for venture capital and 
buyouts from 2006-2013.  
3.6 Argentum’s Role 
Argentum was established in 2001 with the aim of providing a domestically efficient market 
for unlisted firms. Their vision is to be a centre of excellence for international private equity 
and the preferred partner for private equity fund investments in European and energy-
focused funds. This asset manager is wholly owned by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade. 
Argentum manages on behalf of the Norwegian government and for investors who are 
involved in their investor programmes. Argentum is a fund-of-fund company meaning that it 
invests in companies through PE funds. In other words, it doesn’t invest directly in the 
companies. This is a way to diversify risk and obtain a balanced portfolio. 
3.7 Trends for Nordic Market 
Both, Denmark and Norway, have received considerable attention from PE funds during 
2013. Together they have attracted 65% of the total investment in the Nordic market as 
shown in Figure 3.4. Sweden also has a high share of investments, but this is a result of 
having the largest private equity market in the region. It will be interesting to follow the 
positive development that is showing for the Danish and Norwegian markets. 
                                               
5
 Argentum  Annual Norwegian Market Report 2012 
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3.8 Global Trends 
Limited Partners in PE firms are eyeing opportunities for investment in emerging markets 
such as the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). The sentiment is shifting from a 
focus on large buyout funds to smaller ones. Large buyout funds are facing credit difficulties, 
in terms of obtaining credit and renegociating debt terms from the financial crisis era. Figure 
3.5 from a 2011 survey shows that Limited Partner respondents view Asia, China and India 
as the most attractive emerging market regions for investment. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapters 2 and 3 discussed private equity investments in detail. In this chapter, the 
knowledge gained from the literature survey will be used to develop the research 
methodology. The results and discussion will be presented in Chapter 5. 
4.2 Empirical study of the Norwegian Private Equity Market 
In this section, I will direct my focus only on the Norwegian market given time constraints. I 
will consider the Norwegian portfolio companies of the four major Norwegian private equity 
actors described in the previous section; Herkules Capital, HitecVision, Reiten & Co 
Capital Partners and Energy Ventures. Energy Ventures is the only actor in the venture 
capital segment. The study will focus on the indirect drivers of value creation in the portfolio 
companies through a study of board membership by the PE actors. This will enable us to 
evaluate how active these actors are in their portfolio company investment approach.  
 4.3 Hypothesis 
Given that PE firms are active owners, aiming to alleviate agency costs, I expect that they 
take a hands-on approach to management through board membership in their portfolio 
companies.  
4.4 Methodology 
For my methodology, I choose to adopt a semi-quantitative approach. To accomplish this, I 
consider the change in debt/equity one year before PE investment compared to one year after 
PE investment. Additionally, I want to observe whether there is an association between 
certain variables before PE portfolio company investment and board membership of PE 
actors in the year after portfolio company investment.  
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I initially considered interviewing the PE firms and their respective portfolio companies for 
insight into board membership. They were however, unable to participate due to other 
commitments. Qualitative case interviews may have given deeper insight into reasons for 
board membership. Such interviews could have been subjectively biased depending on the 
interviewant and how much information he/she wanted to disclose. Interviews would also be 
time consuming and not feasible given my submission deadline.   
4.5 Variables Studied 
To get an idea of the degree of active ownership through board membership, I will focus on 
whether there is an association between the following independent variables in the year 
before investment (t-1), and board membership from the PE firm in the portfolio companies 
in the year after investment (t+1): 
1) Change in Debt/Equity (from (t-1) to (t+1) 
2) Return on Assets in (t-1) 
3) Portfolio Company Size (As measured by number of employees) in (t-1) 
4.5.a Variable 1 – Change in Debt/Equity 
The first variable is a capital structure variable indicating whether a change in debt levels 
from (t-1) to (t+1) has an association with the number of board members present from the PE 
firm in the year after investment (t+1). Debt can increase the level of financial distress, 
arguing for a higher PE board presence. However, debt is a governance mechanism employed 
by these actors to reduce managerial agency costs in portfolio companies. As debt needs to be 
serviced periodically, it is a way to hinder empire building by managers. PE actors also 
employ debt to increase their returns on investment. I will exclude Energy Ventures from the 
debt/equity analysis as it is mainly the buyout firms that employ debt as a mechanism. 
To see whether debt is employed in buyout portfolio company investments, I will plot the 
change in debt/equity from one year before PE investment to one year after PE investment 
against company name. 
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4.5.b Variable 2 – Return on Assets  
Return on assets, the second variable, is an accounting performance measure indicating the 
profitability of a company relative to its assets. In other words, it indicates how efficiently 
management employs its assets to generate earnings. The purpose of using this variable is to 
see whether the past performance in the year before PE investment of a portfolio company 
has any say for the number of PE board members in the (t+1) year. According to Keasey et al. 
(2005), the role of PE actors varies with respect to performance. If weak performance is 
observed through analysis of financial figures, these actors can take a more controlling 
approach. 
4.7.c Variable 3 – Portfolio Company Size 
For portfolio company size (as measured by total number of employees), I want to observe 
whether there is an association between the size of a portfolio company and how many board 
members the PE actors chose to represent in their respective companies. A larger firm size 
could argue for a higher level of PE board membership in (t+1), given that the control role of 
the board becomes more important. 
4.6 Data Collection 
Given the time limitation of the thesis, I choose to focus only on the active Norwegian 
portfolio company investments of the major Norwegian actors in the PE market.  
To locate the names of the portfolio companies of these actors, I use Argentum’s database. 
For detailed information on each portfolio company, annual reports were downloaded from 
the Register of Company Accounts at the Brønnøysund Register Centre.  
The four major actors described in Section 4.2 have a varying number of portfolio companies 
and operate in different sectors. The Norwegian population I used was fairly small given that 
most of these actors also have a significant international presence. I wanted to observe 
whether certain variables from one year before PE investment (t-1) affect board membership 
from the PE actors one year after PE investment (t+1). This made the population yet smaller 
given that annual reports are not published yet for 2013, which is the year (t+1) for some of 
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the investments. In some cases, I was not able to get reports for (t-1) either, if the portfolio 
company was not established at that time.  
Table 4.1 shows the PE actors, their portfolio companies and the respective years of 
investment that were used in the study. 
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TABLE 4.1 Names of the PE firms and their portfolio companies that were used for this 
study. 
Private Equity Firm Portfolio Company Investing year t 
Energy Ventures Cubility 2007 
Energy Ventures Energreen 2008 
Hitec Vision Aarbakke AS 2006 
Hitec Vision Grenland Group 2009 
Hitec Vision Reef Subsea As 2010 
Herkules Capital Stamina Hot 2011 
Herkules Capital Norsk Jernbanedrift As 2011 
Herkules Capital New Store Europe 2010 
Herkules Capital Til bords 2008 
Herkules Capital Nevion Europe 2008 
Herkules Capital Hatteland Display AS 2007 
Herkules Capital Micro Matic AS 2007 
Reiten & Co StormGeo 2011 
Reiten & Co Questback AS 2008 
Reiten & Co Malthus AS 2006 
Reiten & Co Airlift AS 2007 
Reiten & Co Brubakken 2008 
FSN Capital Norman ASA 2009 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 was a presentation of the motives for investment of PE firms in portfolio 
companies, followed by a literature review of governance mechanisms that such firms 
employ. The literature review highlighted that PE actors are active owners through 
establishment on the boards of their portfolio companies. The chapter concluded with 
empirical evidence from the venture capital and buyout sector, supporting the literature that 
PE firms are active board members in their portfolio companies. In this chapter I shall try to 
find answers to my hypothesis. I shall then discuss the parameters from my methodology and 
their impact on PE board membership in portfolio companies. These parameters are; change 
in debt/equity, past performance as (measured by return on assets) and firm size. 
I choose not to focus on board nationality since the population only includes Norwegian 
board members. Board gender is not particularily interesting either, since there is a mixture of 
both male and female board members before and after PE investment.  
5.2 Change in Debt to Equity ratio  
Figure 5.1 shows the change in debt/equity from the pre-buyout period (t-1) to the year after 
PE investment (t+1) for the portfolio companies in the buyout sector. For HitecVision, there 
is not a significant change in debt/equity. For Herkules Capital, there is a general increase in 
the debt/equity ratio, which could be a result of their strategy. For Reiten & Co, companies 
with high debt in the year before PE investment, experience a significant reduction in debt 
one year after PE investment. This is the case for both Questback and Brubakken. This is in 
line with theory indicating that PE firms try to restructure financially distressed companies. 
These investments are referred to as distressed investments. Reiten & Co increases the 
Debt/Equity ratio in the period (t+1) for those companies with not so significant debt ratios, 
for example StormGeo and Airlift.  
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FIGURE 5.1 Change in debt/equity from (t-1) to (t+1) for portfolio companies 
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5.3 Association of Change in Debt/Equity on Board 
Representation in (t+1) 
It may be expected that when the crucial policy decision to increase debt in portfolio 
companies has been taken, private equity actors would like to have more of their own 
members on board. Figure 5.2 shows the effect of change in debt/equity from (t-1) to (t+1) 
on board representation in (t+1). The figure indicates that generally as the debt/equity ratio 
changes from the period (t-1) to (t+1), the board representation by PE actors also changes in 
portfolio companies. This could be a result of a desire to monitor the portfolio companies 
more given an increase in leverage and indirect/direct costs of bankrupcy. There is however, 
no general trend in the results. The majority of portfolio companies have between 20-40% 
board representation from the PE actors in the year (t+1). Some exceptions are: 
• Nevion, Hatteland and Micro Matic from Herkules Capital have a significantly higher 
board representation as compared to the remainder of the population.  
• New Store Europe, a portfolio company of Herkules Capital, has fairly low board 
representation.  
• StormGeo from Reiten & Co Capital Partners have similarily low board 
representation even with a positive increase in the debt/equity ratio.  
• Aarbakke of HitecVision has no change in debt/equity but nonetheless has a fairly 
high board representation.  
They theory mentions the disciplinary role of debt. In the case of Aarbakke, even an increase 
in debt may not provide adequate incentives for management, therefore requiring a fairly high 
percentage of board representation from HitecVision. The lack of trends for these companies 
can highlight that PE board representation here can be associated with other reasons besides 
debt. 
5.4 Association of Return on Assets 
Figure 5.3 shows the association of return on assets from (t-1) on board representation by PE 
actors in (t+1). The figure shows that irrespective of return on assets from the (t-1) year, most 
portfolio companies have between 20-40% board representation. Some exceptions are: 
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FIGURE 5.2 Association of change in debt to equity ratio and board representation in the 
year (t+1).  
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FIGURE 5.3 Association of return on assets in (t-1) and board representation in (t+1).  
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• In the case of Nevion, they have 100% board representation when there is no return 
on assets in the period (t-1). In other words, the entire board is replaced with members 
from the PE firm. This indicates that PE actors take an active, hands-on approach in 
their portfolio companies if they are performing poorly.  
• Hatteland and Micro Matic from Herkules however, have high board representation 
even with positive return on assets in the year before PE investment.  
• New Store Europe have low PE board representation even with negative return on 
assets in (t-1).  
This goes to show that board representation isn’t really correlated with return on assets. 
Board membership is an indirect driver of value creation which explains its lack of 
correlation with a direct driver. Keasey et. al. (2005) mention that the role of PE actors vary 
with respect to firm performance. They argue for more PE involvement as a result of weak 
performance. In my population it can be the case that there are other underlying reasons for 
board representation that do not depend on portfolio company past performance.  
5.5 Association of Firm Size 
Figure 5.4 shows the association of firm size, as represented by number of employees, on 
board representation by PE actors. This graph shows that firm size as measured by number of 
employees, does not have much of a say for the representation of PE members on the boards 
of portfolio companies. The theory mentions that the board control role could increase with 
firm size, arguing for an increased board presence by PE actors, but this is not the case for my 
sample. Keasey et al. (2005) mentions that board representation can be higher in larger and 
more complex firms, given that monitoring can become more difficult. It may not be that the 
size of the firm fully explains board representation, but instead the degree of challenges 
facing the firms. The competence and experience that PE actors offer can vary depending on 
the complexity of transactions as opposed to just the size of their portfolio companies. 
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FIGURE 5.4 Association of Firm Size (Number of Employees) and board representation in 
(t+1). 
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5.6 Association of PE Ownership Share 
In addition to being active on the boards of portfolio companies, PE firms also have a 
majority ownership stake in these companies.  
For the funds of the buyout firms HitecVision, Herkules Capital and Reiten & Co, the 
ownership shares range from about 50% to 100%. Energy Ventures, the venture capital firm, 
have a smaller ownership share, but are nonetheless majority owners in their portfolio 
companies. 
The ownership shares of the PE firms in the buyout and venture capital sectors illustrate that 
these firms are majority owners in their portfolio companies. Although it doesn’t give an 
indication of the degree of active ownership, it suggests that these firms will take an active 
approach to management in their portfolio companies through board membership. Rogers and 
Holland (2002) highlight that PE actors, as co-owners or total owners, provide hands-on 
governance in portfolio companies. The PE firms have a significant stake in their companies 
through invested money and majority ownership. 
Table 5.1 illustrates the ownership shares of each of the PE funds in their portfolio 
companies. 
5.7 Findings 
From the work carried out the the following findings can be highlighted:  
1) The study indicates that PE actors use their influence as majority owners by being active 
on the boards of their portfolio companies. This was also the case in the study conducted 
by Cotter and Peck (2001) and by Cornelli (2010) in their East European sample. There is 
always a representation from the PE firm on the boards of their portfolio companies. This 
can range from approximately 10% board membership to a complete takeover of the 
board.  The analysis clearly shows that the number of PE board members vary on a case 
to case basis. PE board representation depends on the amount of time and effort these 
actors want to devote to their companies, as well the complexity of the the transactions.  
 
 Chapter 5 Results and Discussion 
 
51 
 
TABLE 5.1 Ownership shares of PE funds in their portfolio companies. 
Private 
Equity Firm 
Portfolio 
Company 
Investing 
year t Majority Owner at (t+1) 
Share (%) at  
(t+1) 
Energy 
Ventures Cubility 2007 Energy Ventures 2 KS 39.21 
Energy 
Ventures Energreen 2008 Energy Ventures 2 LP 28.26 
HitecVision Grenland Group 2009 HVS Invest AS 75.20 
HitecVision Aarbakke Group 2006 HitecVision PE IV LP 49.70 
Herkules 
Capital Stamina Hot 2011 
Herkules Private Equity III 
LP 90.00 
Herkules 
Capital 
Norsk 
Jernbanedrift 2011 
Herkules Private Equity III 
GPII + GP 1 67.00 
Herkules 
Capital 
New Store 
Europe 2010 Herkules Private Equity III 83.14 
Herkules 
Capital Til bords 2008 Herkules Private Equity II 100.00 
Herkules 
Capital 
Nevion 
EuropeAS 2008 Herkules Private EquityII 100.00 
Herkules 
Capital 
Hatteland 
Display AS 2007 Herkules Private Equity II 95.56 
Herkules 
Capital 
Micromatic 
AS 2007 Herkules Private Equity II 90.74 
Reiten & Co StormGeo 2011 Reiten & Co Capital partners VII 66.50 
Reiten & Co Questback AS 2008 Reiten & Co Capital partners VII 68.00 
Reiten & Co Malthus AS 2006 Reiten & Co Capital partners VI 62.40 
Reiten & Co Airlift AS 2007 Reiten&Co Cap partners VI 60.00 
Reiten & Co Brubakken 2008 Reiten&CO cappartnersVII 88.10 
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2) PE actors can restructure debt. This is visible in the year after investment for the case of 
two of the portfolio company investments of Reiten & Co. Questback AS had a quite 
drastic restructuring. Brubakken was also restructured but not to the same extent as 
Questback.  
3) Buyout actors generally leverage their companies. Debt is a mechanism to reduce agency 
costs, as was highlighted by Achleitner, Betzer et. al (2010). PE actors can also decrease 
debt levels depending on their individual strategies. 
4) Past performance as measured by return on assets is not showing an association with PE 
board membership in the year after PE investment 
5) Portfolio company size appears to not have any say in predicting how many board 
members will be present from the PE firm on these boards. 
The findings suggest that one needs to examine portfolio companies on an individual case to 
case basis to get an understanding of the underlying motives behind PE board member 
representation. This examination can be done by going deeper into the company annual 
reports or through qualitative research. Nevion, Micro Matic, Aarbakke, and Hatteland are 
interesting cases, given their deviations from the remainder of the population. They have 
significantly higher board membership from the PE firms. Similarily, New Store Europe and 
StormGeo are interesting given their relatively low level of board membership by the PE 
firms. What all these company cases have in common is that they are all innovative and are 
leaders in their respective segments. 
5.7.a Case 1: Nevion AS from Herkules Capital 
Nevion is a company headquartered in Sandefjord, Norway. They operate in the international 
telecom market, providing broadcasting equipment to broadcasters and telecom companies. 
Gert Munthe from Herkules Capital believes that there are good possibilities for growth in 
this fragmented industry.  
Nevion activated six projects in 2009, which is the year after PE investment. During this year, 
the NOK strengthened against the USD and the Euro. This had a considerable effect on 
Nevion, as a considerable share of their purchases were made in these two currencies. They 
mention in their annual report for 2009 that the market was demanding as a result of the 
financial crisis.  
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The industry will need time to improve given the economically challenging situation. Future 
market conditions remain uncertain despite the fact that long-term prospects seem promising. 
Obtaining growth under challenging market conditions may be a reason why they require a 
high degree of board members on their boards from PE actors in the year after investment. 
They may also require the strategic competence of these actors when preparing for 
techological shifts, new logistics solutions and threats from competitors. PE representation 
through number of board members can be a reason why they state that they are in satisfactory 
economic position despite the challenging market.  
5.7.b Case 2: Micro Matic Norge AS from Herkules Capital 
Micro Matic Norge AS operates in the electrical equipment industry and is based in Hvalstad, 
Norway.  It has a leading position in Norway within technical control systems and design 
installation materials.6 Micro Matic has experienced strong growth in recent years. In 2005 
they had a turnover of NOK 164 million and operating profit of NOK 35 million, as reported 
on the website of Herkules Capital.  
This innovative company with a solid customer, supplier and productbase, matched the 
investment philosophy of Herkules Capital well. In this case, there was a high degree of 
board members on the board from Herkules Capital, despite the fact that Micro Matic were 
performing with a return on assets of over 40% in the year before PE investment. There was 
not a considerable change in debt/equity either in the year before investment compared to the 
year after investment. In their annual reports, Micro Matic mentioned that the conditions for 
the electrobranch and building branch in Norway were uncertain. There was strong 
competition in their branch. This could explain why they required a high degree of strategic 
involvement from the PE firms to position themselves in a demanding market. Micro Matic 
faced exchange rate problems in the year after PE investment (t+1) as a result of a 
depreciation of the Norwegian kroner. This situation stabilised in 2009, but was nowhere near 
the normal level. The uncertainty surrounding the exchange rate could have been an 
explanation as to why Micro Matic required decision making input from Herkules Capital. 
Micro Matic wanted to protect their market position as well as grow in terms of providing 
innovative solutions to other markets. 
                                               
6
 http://www.herkulescapital.no/index.php?visID=10 
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5.7.c Case 3: Aarbakke Group AS from HitecVision 
Aarbakke is a leader in Europe for the supply of specialized manufacturing services to the oil 
and gas industry. They are situated in the Stavanger region of Norway.  
I wanted to examine Aarbakke from HitecVision deeply given the high degree of PE 
involvement on the board despite no change in the debt/equity level. Aarbakke were also 
performing with positive return on assets in the year before PE investment. In the annual 
reports, Aarbakke mention the adverse impact of the financial crisis on the company in the 
(t+1) period, which happened to be 2007 in this case. Aarbakke experienced a risk from 
competition as its competitors also could perform similar activities. Despite the impact of the 
financial crisis, Aarbakke Group acquired ITM in 2007, which is a leader in tubular services. 
With the aid of the PE firm, Aarbakke Group strengthened their position.  
Aarbakke Group is optimistic that liquidity will develop positively over time. 
5.7.d Case 4: Hatteland Display AS from Herkules Capital: 
Hatteland Display AS manufactures industrial and consumer goods and is a leader in the 
manufacturing of displays used in the maritime sector. They are situated in Stavanger, 
Norway. According to Herkules Capital, Hatteland has had strong growth over the years and 
has established a solid product base.  
It is interesting given the high percentage representation of Herkules Capital members on the 
board in the period (t+1) even with a positive performance as measured by return on assets in 
the period before investment (t-1). Additionally, the debt level for Hatteland rose 
significantly as compared to the rest of the Herkules Capital population. The annual reports 
mentioned that Hatteland got a new CEO in 2008. Exchange rates posed a direct and indirect 
economic risk for the company. No deals were in place to reduce this. PE competence may 
have been necessary to establish a strategy dealing with this exchange rate risk. The financial 
crisis had an impact on Hatteland, as was also the case for Nevion. The company expected a 
lower sales level in 2009 and required a plan of action to deal with this, through structural 
cost changes. In this case operational competence was required from the PE firm to execute 
cost changes. Such changes were important given that they deal with demanding customers 
from the maritime sector that were mainly situated in Europe. The business group wes fairly 
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new at the time, given that it was established in 2007, hence, required adequate monitoring 
and council from the investing PE firm to achieve further growth. 
5.7.e Case 5: New Store Europe AS from Herkules Capital 
New Store Europe is an innovative leader in store interior and store design in Europe, situated 
in Vinterbro. Gert Munthe from Herkules Capital views this market as an attractive 
investment. This is an interesting case given a fairly low degree of board members from the 
PE actors despite poor performance as measured by return on assets in the year before 
investment.  
New Store Europes’ debt/equity level also increased in the year after PE investment. This 
could argue for more PE representation on the board, given an increased level of distress. It 
may however not be of much significance if debt is used as a mechanism to incentivise 
management to produce periodic results to service this debt. 
An increase in debt for this company could be a result of their decision to buy 51% stock in 
New Store Denmark AS. 100% stock was also bought in Kleerex Group Holding Lt. The 
purchase of Kleerex strengthened New Store Europe’s position in one of Europe’s biggest 
and most important markets. This made the future prospects good. Shopex in Holland was 
bought. Shopex is a market leader in their brand segment. This strengthening of market 
position could argue for why they didn’t require much expertise or strategic input from PE 
actors. There was some macroeconomic uncertainty in 2011 relating to customer buying 
prefences for store inventory goods. The company feels that they have a solid strategic 
platform from 2010. Additionally, they have a sourcing supplier in China helping them to 
deliver cost-effective products. Having a high degree of PE board membership would perhaps 
therefore not add additional value. The PE board representation may have however helped 
them broaden their network to include international customers. PE firms have strategic 
connections and expertise. 
5.7.f Case 6: StormGeo AS from Reiten & Co Capital Partners 
StormGeo is a leading weather forecasting company in Scandinavia measuring risk on the 
behalf of international customers. StormGeo is headquartered in Bergen.  
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They had an increase in their debt level in the year after PE investment and were performing 
with positive return on assets in the year before PE investment. I wanted to uncover why the 
board representation from the PE firm was considerably lower in this case compared to the 
rest of my population. Based on their annual reports, StormGeo reported a minimal exchange 
rate risk for 2012, which was the year after PE investment. They were generally doing well in 
2012 and had strengthened their competence. StormGeo were financing two Ph.D. 
candidates. They won new contracts and offices were established in Reo De Janeiro and 
Singapore. StormGeo reported that they had a growth of 285% in the year of PE investment 
(year t). This can argue for why it wasen’t necessary to have so many members in the board 
from Reiten & Co in the year after investment (t+1). 
5.8 Discussion of Empirical Study 
The conclusions from the quantitative part of the empirical study indicated that PE firms 
indeed took an active role in the boards of their portfolio companies as Cornelli et al (2010) 
also documented. This was because they invested money and acquired a majority ownership 
stake in their portfolio companies. There was always a certain degree of board representation, 
as measured by number of board members, in the portfolio companies in the year after PE 
investment (t+1). In one case there was a complete replacement of the portfolio company 
board with PE members, suggesting that PE firms may even significantly restructure boards. 
The buyout PE firms generally tended to employ debt as a mechanism in their portfolio 
companies as observed from my Norwegian population. Cotter and Peck (2001) also 
observed that long-term debt was used in buyouts. Appelbaum and Batt (2012) argued that a 
reason for this could be that the general and limited partners largely are shielded from the 
debt effects of distress. Another reason relates to the advantage of tax shields from debt. In 
some cases, they restructured debt for their portfolio companies. There was however, no clear 
trend between the number of PE board members in the year after investment and the change 
in the debt/equity ratio. One should also consider managerial equity share and incentive 
compensation packages for them. It is not necessarily the case that a higher number of PE 
board members will be present on the boards in their companies just as a result of increased 
debt. Even with a positive increase in debt levels, PE actors may not feel the need to monitor 
to a large extent, if the managers already are incentivized. Debt could incentivise managers as 
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it needs to be periodically serviced. This can restore their entrepreneurial spirit, driving them 
to work harder and close unprofitable business segments. PE actors can still provide council, 
however a large presence on the portfolio company boards may not be required, even though 
leverage may potentially increase the level of financial distress in the company. 
There was no visible trend between past performance of portfolio companies and the number 
of PE actors on the board in the year after investment. It was not necessarily the case that 
poor past performance as measured by return on assets, led to higher level of control by PE 
actors through increased board membership. This seems reasonable given that number of 
board members and return on assets aren’t directly correlated. Board membership is an 
indirect driver of value creation whereas return on assets is a direct driver.  
The results showed that portfolio company size, as measured by the number of employees, 
did not show association with the number of board members from the PE firm in the year 
after investment. Large firm size could have argued for a stronger control role on the board 
for PE actors and hence a greater number of members.  
Although I was able to uncover that PE actors were active on their portfolio company boards 
and that debt was generally a governance mechanism used in the buyout sector, I did not get a 
clear understanding of the underlying reasons for low or high board membership by PE actors 
in their portfolio companies. This called for a qualitative case based approach of analysis. I 
therefore chose to examine six portfolio companies which deviated in terms of number of PE 
board members, from the remainder of the population. This culminated in some interesting 
findings. I discovered that the PE board membership level depends largely on strategic 
factors and on industry conditions. Challenging industry conditions and the financial crisis 
were reasons why a significant level of strategic input was required from the PE firms. The 
companies especially required competence from the PE actors to undertake strategic changes 
as a result of macroeconomic conditions, such as exchange rate risk. The strategic position of 
the portfolio company had a say in how many board members were present from the PE firm. 
If the companies had a strong position in their markets relative to their competitors, they 
didn’t feel that value was added through a large number of PE members on their boards. The 
degree of impact the PE firm had from the investing year in the portfolio companies therefore 
had a say in how many board members they chose to have in the year after investment (t+1). 
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The findings from the qualitative section of the study are in line with previous empirical 
findings on private equity. The case studies indicate that PE actors focus on the most vital 
issues of business and not in daily activity involvement. Acharya et. al (2009) also found that 
buyout backed companies are active in strategy development and operations. Operational 
expertise may also be required under challenging market conditions. It is however crucial that 
operational expertise is embedded in the PE firm culture. This will enable the PE firm to 
successfully transfer their operational expertise to the portfolio companies. The portfolio 
companies should similarily possess an operational focus, to benefit maximally from PE firm 
expertise. The qualitative results additionally confirm that experience from PE firms is an 
important governance mechanism. Wright, Gilligan et. al (2009) found that PE actors use 
their industry expertise to build better businesses. 
There has been an uneven sector distribution of portfolio companies in favour of the oil, gas, 
IT and business service sectors in Norway as described in NVCA Yearbook (2008). It was 
enlightening to discover from the cases that some of the major Norwegian PE actors also are 
diverting their attention to other sectors besides just the oil and IT dominated sectors. For 
example Herkules Capital is focusing on portfolio company investments in a variety of 
industries such as telecom, electricity, consumer and industrial goods. Reiten & Co also have 
a generalist focus and their StormGeo investment is in the industrial sector. Based on 
information from the NVCA Yearbook (2008), it is expected that more investments will be 
undertaken in culture, leasure and media in the near future. This is a result of growing 
demand in such sectors, allowing potential for PE actors to invest. In terms of regions of 
investment, the cases match the findings in NVCA Yearbook (2008) that there is more 
activity in the Oslo, Eastern and Southern Norway regions. This raises a concern that PE 
actors may be too focused on labour-intensive regions, thus leading to the rural regions 
falling behind economically. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has focused on the indirect drivers of value creation through a study of corporate 
governance mechanisms employed in the Norwegian population of portfolio company 
investments of the four major Norwegian PE contestants between 2006 and 2011. The 
population of portfolio company investments considered both the venture and buyout sectors. 
My intention was to study active ownership through board representation by PE actors in 
their portfolio company investments. I also wanted to uncover the extent of debt use by PE 
actors in buyout sector portfolio company investments. 
The quantitative results revealed that the Norwegian PE actors in the buyout sector generally 
leveraged their companies, but may also restructure companies. All PE actors acquired 
majority ownership stakes and invested time and money in their portfolio companies. As co-
owners or total owners, they provided a hands-on approach to governance in their companies 
through active board representation. All portfolio companies had board representation by the 
PE actors in the year after investment (t+1). Most companies had between 20-40% board 
representation from the PE actors. There was however, not much of a trend over time 
between the variables I employed and the degree of board representation in PE portfolio 
companies. Regarding the results, I chose not to conduct statistical tests, given that what I 
analysed was really the Norwegian population of active PE portfolio investments (based on 
what could be found in the Brønnøysund Register of Company Accounts). 
The lack of general trends in the quantitative analysis led me to logically take a qualitative 
approach to analyze case studies for underlying reasons why some companies deviate in PE 
board representation from the remainder of the population. The qualitative results showed 
that PE actors were involved on a strategic, financial and operational level in their companies. 
This is in line with theory highlighting how there is a focus on the most vital areas of 
business. The portfolio companies are all leaders in their market segments and through PE 
board membership they were able to induce further growth and innovation. The degree of PE 
board representation varied on a case to case basis, depending on factors such as general 
macroeconomic conditions, industry conditions and the strategic positioning of the portfolio 
companies.  
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The cases highlight that in Norway, investments are being made in a variety of sectors, in 
addition to the oil dominated sector. The investments are also found to be regionally 
clustered. PE investments are regionally clustered in the Oslo, Eastern and Southern Norway 
regions. The PE focus on the most labour intensive regions of Norway raises the concern that 
certain other regions might be unable to reap benefits that these actors offer.   
Norway is facing a demographic shift resulting from an ageing population. PE actors should 
examine a wider horizon of potential investments in the future, given that an ageing 
Norwegian population will seek to replace ownership in various sectors. PE actors should 
therefore consider a larger selection of investment cases. The business environment and 
institutions can stimulate investments in potential value creating sector cases through 
increased focus on valuation of companies. This can be one way to stimulate ownership 
activity as illustrated in NVCA Yearbook (2008). Buyout sector competence and the 
supporting management environment will be important given that many of the retiring ageing 
firm owners have established mature companies. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
I chose to only study boards of Norwegian PE backed portfolio companies due to time 
constraints. Future studies can extend this study to include all portfolio company investments 
of the major Norwegian PE actors. They can make comparisons to other Nordic markets.   
Other corporate governance mechanisms in portfolio companies should also be researched. 
The role of managerial equity stakes and managerial compensation packages as incentives to 
create value in PE backed companies could be researched. With access to data on PE deals, 
one can evaluate deal characteristics and their impact as a governance mechanism both at the 
PE fund and portfolio company level. Such deal characteristics could for example relate to 
contractual obligations for the parties involved. 
My results showed that PE actors are involved at a financial and strategic level in their 
portfolio companies through the provision of strategic advice and financial restructuring. 
They can also provide operational competence for portfolio companies in certain branches 
and sectors. It would be interesting for future studies to research in depth how PE actors 
implement changes in portfolio companies at an operational level. Studies could direct their 
focus on the effectiveness of lean manufacturing for operations in portfolio companies. 
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